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Abstract
The paper provides two alternative completions of the Pareto ordering on finite
dimensional compact sets. Applied to bargaining games they lead to the Pareto
efficient boundary and to the Nash solution, respectively, as sets of maximal ele-
ments. In particular, the second of these complete preorderings is represented by the
Nash product. This provides an interesting “straightforward interpretation” that
the Nash product according to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 303) is lacking.
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1 Introduction
The Nash bargaining solution is the most prominent solution concept for bargaining
games. Introduced by John Nash (1953) it had been characterized in many different
ways. It seems to be the undisputed favorite in the applied literature for labour negotia-
tions and all kind of bargaining situations. The simplest way of defining or describing it
has been provided already by Nash (1953) in addition to his axiomatic characterization,
namely as the unique maximizer of the so called “Nash product”.
While all other characterizations, via axioms or via support by equilibria of non-cooperative
games appear to reflect different aspects of this solution and to open new ways of inter-
pretation its most simple description via the Nash product seems to have escaped up to
now a meaningful interpretation. It is true that interpreted as a social planner’s utility
function it represents the same social preference as the sum of the logarithms of utilities
reflecting specific expected utilities. Also, it represents the social preference of a neutral
benevolent planner that neglects positive affine transformations of players’ utilities and a
priori needs not be be either complete or transitive (cf. Trockel 1999). Yet, concerning
its direct interpretation the situation is best described by the quotation of Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994, p. 303):
“Although the maximization of a product of utilities is a simple mathematical operation it
lacks a straightforward interpretation; we view it simply as a technical device.”
It is the purpose of the present note to provide one straightforward, in fact surprising
interpretation. Maximizing the Nash product is equivalent to finding maximal elements
of one natural completion of the Pareto ordering. The maximal elements for the other
natural completion are just the Pareto optimal points.
2 The model
We shall look at the vector ordering and complete preorderings on compact subsets of Rn
but restrict the analysis without loss of generality to the case n = 2.
A complete preordering % on a compact set S is a complete, transitive (hence reflexive)
binary relation on S. The weak vector ordering ≥ in contrast fails to be complete. It is,
however, transitive, too.
To make things simple assume % on S to be continuous, hence representable by a con-
tinuous utility function u : S −→ R. The %-maximal elements are given by the set of
maximizers of u on S, i.e. argmaxx∈ S u(x).
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Let B%(x) be the set {x′ ∈ S|x′ % x} and W%(x) the set {x′ ∈ S|x % x′}.
For any x′, x ∈ S we obviously have:
x′ ∼ x⇔ λ(B%(x)) = λ(B%(x′)) ⇔ λ(W%(x)) = λ(W%(x′)).
λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on R2 the extension of the natural measure of area in R2
to all Lebesgue measurable sets.
The correspondences B% : S =⇒ S and W% : S =⇒ S composed with the Lebesgue
measure define alternative utility functions λ ◦ B% and λ ◦W% representing % as well as
u.
Now consider for the vector ordering ≥ the analogous sets B≥(x), W≥(x) for arbitrary
x ∈ S.
B≥(x) = {x′ ∈ S|x′ ≥ x}, W≥(x) = {x′ ∈ S|x ≥ x′}.
Next, introduce the mappings λ ◦B≥ and λ ◦W≥ defined by:
λ ◦B≥(x) := λ(B≥(x)) and λ ◦W≥(x) := λ(W≥(x)).
Both are mappings from S to R and define therefore preference relations that are com-
pletions of ≥.
We have x ≥ x′ =⇒ λ(B≥(x)) ≤ λ(B≥(x′)) and x ≥ x′ =⇒ λ(W≥(x)) ≥ λ(W≥(x′)).
The two dual completions of ≥ are different in general.
x %1 x′ :⇐⇒ λ(B≥(x)) ≤ λ(B≥(x′))
x %2 x′ :⇐⇒ λ(W≥(x)) ≥ λ(W≥(x′)).
They only coincide when the binary relation one starts with is already a complete pre-
ordering. Notice, that B≥(x) and W≥(x) are in general proper subsets of B%1(x) and
W%2(x), respectively.
3 Application to bargaining games
To keep things simple we define a normalized two-person bargaining game S as the sub-
graph of a concave strictly decreasing function f from [0, 1] onto [0, 1].
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The two axes represent the players’ utilities, S the feasible set of utility allocations. The
vector ordering on S represents in this framework the Pareto ordering.
The efficient boundary graphf of S is the set of Pareto optimal points or vector maxima.
Obviously each point x in graphf minimizes the value of λ ◦B≥. In fact, for x ∈ graphf
we have λ(B≥(x)) = 0
Notice that λ(W≥(x)) takes different values when x varies in graphf .
Now, consider the set argmaxx∈S λ(W≥(x)) of maximizers of λ ◦W≥. This set is exactly
the set {N(S)} where N(S) is the Nash solution of S. Maximizing the Nash product x1x2
for x ∈ S means maximizing the measure of points in S Pareto dominated by x′.
Hence the two completions %1,%2 of the Pareto ordering ≥ on S have as their sets of
maximizers the Pareto efficient boundary and the Nash solution, respectively.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that two different methods of representing complete preorderings via the
measure of better sets versus worse sets may be applied as well to incomplete binary
relations. Here they lead to two different functions inducing two different complete pre-
orderings.
Applied to the non-complete Pareto ordering on a compact set S representing a bargaining
situation the two completions have as their respective sets of maximizers the Pareto
efficient boundary and the Nash solution of S.
This result provides a straightforward interesting interpretation of the Nash solution as a
dual version of Pareto optimality. In contrast to the latter it has the advantage to single
out a unique point in the efficient boundary.
The idea of defining rankings by counting the less preferred alternatives has an old tra-
dition in social choice theory as the famous Borda Count (cf. Borda 1781) shows. In our
context with a continuum of social alternatives counting is replaced by measuring. The
level sets of the Nash product collect those utility allocations dominating equally large
(in terms of Lebesgue measure) sets of alternatives.
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